Sinclair v Brougham and Change of Position by Scott, Struan
313
Sinclair v Brougham and Change of Position
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Introduction
Sinclair v Brougham1 is a “bewildering authority”.2 Critics speak positively 
about aspects of it. Eoin O’Dell, for example, criticised their Lordships 
for elements of “legal madness”;3 yet he notes that they were judges 
of “exceptional ability”, “with an equitable eye to a just outcome”.4 
Conversely, Lord Wright, who believed the case to be of “first-rate 
importance”, concedes concerns.5 These include the “rever[sion] to 
legal antiquarianism in order to explain” why the Birkbeck Building 
Society was not legally indebted for the ultra vires borrowing nor under 
a personal restitutionary liability to restore it.6 Turning to why some 
believe the case is important, to paraphrase Lord Wright, it shows that 
in some situations the law responds to “the retention [of an enrichment], 
not the receipt” of one.7 
Since Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC 
(‘Westdeutsche’),8 Sinclair v Brougham has been regarded as overturned. 
This was the conclusion of the English Court of Appeal in Haugesund 
Kommune v Depfa Acs Bank (‘Haugesund’).9 Consistent with Birks’ 
suggestion, that the reasoning in Sinclair v Brougham was influenced by 
the “limited weapons” then available,10 particularly the lack of a change 
of position defence, the Haugesund Court confirmed not only the existence 
of a personal claim in unjust enrichment to recover ultra vires borrowing 
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1 Sinclair v Brougham [1914] AC 398 (HL).
2 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council 
[1996] AC 669 (HL) at 713 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
3 Eoin O’Dell “Sinclair v Brougham (1914)” in Landmark Cases in the Law of 
Restitution Charles Mitchell and Paul Mitchell (eds) (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2006) 213 at 218.
4 At 213.
5 Lord Wright “Sinclair v Brougham” in Legal Essays and Addresses 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1939) at 1 (first published (1938) 
6 CLJ 305). See also Samuel Stoljar “Re-examining Sinclair v Brougham” 
(1959) 22(1) Mod L Rev 21 at 21.
6 Wright, above n 5, at 16.
7 At 21. 
8 Westdeutsche, above n 2.
9 Haugesund Kommune v Depfa Acs Bank [2010] EWCA Civ 579, [2012] QB 
549.
10 Peter Birks Unjust Enrichment (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford) 
at 254.
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but also that the claim was potentially subject to that defence. 
Sinclair v Brougham predated the judicial acceptance of ‘change of 
position’ into the common law by about eighty years.11 Its acceptance 
may explain the judicial willingness to overrule the denial of the personal 
restitutionary claim in Sinclair v Brougham. As Birks observes:12
With the defence of change of position in place, it had become apparent 
that even the personal claim in unjust enrichment did not have the same 
content as the claim on the contract of loan.
An impetus for this paper is the belief, derived from Lord Wright, that 
the precedential importance of Sinclair v Brougham lies in its “decision”13 
– that the depositors had a claim to recover the value of the enrichment 
(derived from the ultra vires borrowing) that remained following its 
unauthorised use and that of the shareholders’ funds. A premise of this 
paper is that this was the “just outcome” (to borrow O’Dell’s words). 
This article considers the ability of change of position to achieve a similar 
result. 
A second impetus for this paper is Haugesund. As noted earlier it 
involved a consideration of change of position in the context of ultra 
vires borrowing. The Court of Appeal held that the defence was not 
established on the facts. A message of this paper is that care must be 
taken with the application of the reasoning in that case. This is because, 
as noted above, Sinclair v Brougham involved a more complex situation. 
In Sinclair v Brougham not only were the depositors’ contracts of loan void 
for being ultra vires the Society (the situation contemplated in Haugesund 
(and Westdeutsche)) but the subsequent use of those funds was also ultra 
vires the Society. I shall refer to the Sinclair v Brougham type situation as 
the ‘ultra vires borrowing and unauthorised use situation’.
A third impetus is the recent work of James Goudkamp suggesting a 
distinction between ‘defences’ and ‘denials’.14 In the context of an unjust 
enrichment claim, a ‘denial’ is directed to negating one of the elements 
of the claim, for example, that the defendant received a benefit or an 
enrichment. By contrast, a ‘defence’ assumes that all the elements have 
been satisfied but raises a reason why the claim should be reduced or 
should not succeed. 15 When Goudkamp and Charles Mitchell applied this 
distinction to the change of position defence a confused picture emerged – 
in some situations change of position appears to operate as a defence but 
in other situations as a denial.16 Indeed, subsequently Dennis Klimchuk 
11 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 (HL).
12 Birks, above n 10, at 254.
13 Wright, above n 5, at 19.
14 James Goudkamp Tort Law Defences (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2013).
15 James Goudkamp and Charles Mitchell “Denials and Defences in the 
Law of Unjust Enrichment” in Charles Mitchell and William Swadling 
(eds) The Restatement Third: Restitution and Unjust Enrichment: Critical and 
Comparative Essays (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2013) 133 at 139.
16 At 156–157.
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has suggested that it may operate as a ‘defeat’ – “a claim that undercuts a 
cause of action without precisely denying any of its elements”.17 Clearly 
commentators are revealing underlying complexities with the application 
of change of position. This diversity suggests that ‘the change of position 
defence’ is better seen as encompassing a number of ‘defences’. 
The conclusion reached in this paper is that change of position is able 
to replicate the result in Sinclair v Brougham but in order for it to do so its 
application in the ultra vires borrowing and unauthorised use situation 
needs to be seen as sui juris, enabling it to respond to the complexities 
that arise in this situation, particularly the policy considerations that 
underlie why the use of the funds is ultra vires. The policy considerations 
determine the circumstances in which the use of the funds is regarded 
as having produced a surviving enrichment.18 At its core, however, its 
focus is on whether the ‘borrower’ remains enriched following the use 
of the funds. The end result, as in Sinclair v Brougham, is that the plaintiff 
‘lender’ can recover the surviving enrichment.
This article is divided into three substantive parts. Part One is a brief 
reminder of Sinclair v Brougham, principally its facts and the reasons that 
made this case such a complicated one for their Lordships. Until the 
work of Goudkamp, Mitchell and others, the focus on retention of the 
enrichment suggested by Sinclair v Brougham seemed contrary to current 
unjust enrichment theory, which instead focuses upon the fact of receipt. 
Part Two briefly reviews current theory in conjunction with considering 
Westdeutsche and Haugesund. As noted earlier, these cases, despite their 
apparent factual similarity to Sinclair v Brougham, did not involve ultra 
vires borrowing and unauthorised use, just ultra vires borrowing. Part 
Two explores this difference. 
Against this background, Part Three explores the significance of the 
researches of Goudkamp and others to our understanding of change of 
position and suggests how change of position should apply in the ultra 
vires borrowing and unauthorised use situation.
Part One: Sinclair v Brougham
This case arose out of the 1911 collapse of the Birkbeck Bank or, more 
accurately, the collapse of the Birkbeck Building Society. The Society 
was established in 1851 under the Building Societies Act 1836. As Stoljar 
explains the “main task” of building societies at that time “was to bring 
together those willing to lend and those wishing to borrow money for 
the building of houses”.19 In its purest form, membership of building 
societies was comprised of ‘investing’ members or shareholders (the 
17 Dennis Klimchuk “What Kind of Defence is Change of Position?” in 
Andrew Dyson and James Goudkamp and Frederick Wilmot-Smith (eds) 
Defences in Unjust Enrichment (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2016) 69 at 85.
18 An example may be a minor’s use of borrowed funds to pay for 
necessaries.
19 Stoljar, above n 5, at 21.
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lenders) and ‘advanced’ members/shareholders (the borrowing house 
builders).20 The Birkbeck Building Society was empowered to borrow 
from shareholders for its purposes as a building society.21 
By about 1871 the Society’s business had evolved into that of a bank. 
It sought deposits from non-members, made loans to customers and 
invested in securities as if a bank.22 Indeed, the Society started trading 
as the ‘Birkbeck Bank’. Lord Sumner noted that “the fact that a banking 
business was being carried on was a matter of notoriety and even of 
pride”.23 Stoljar’s researches confirmed that the Birkbeck Bank became 
one of London’s important smaller banks.24 Both aspects of the banking 
business – the borrowing and re-lending/investing – were ultra vires 
the Society. This carried a number of consequences. One consequence 
was that the Society and its agents lacked the legal capacity to borrow 
from the depositors for the purposes of a banking business. Lord Parker 
concluded that the depositors “must have been aware” of this.25 A second 
consequence was that the Society and its agents lacked the legal capacity 
to ‘lend’ that money “to customers with whom it dealt as a banker” and 
to “inves[t]” that money “in securities for banking purposes”.26
In 1911 the public lost confidence in the ‘Bank’. Following a “run” 
the Society was placed into liquidation.27 The key issue was the relative 
merits of the competing claims of the Bank depositors and the Society’s 
shareholders.28 
At trial Neville J considered that the ultra vires nature of the borrowing 
meant that the depositors could claim only against the assets, once costs, 
trade creditors and shareholders had been paid.29 In the case of the 
shareholders, this included the value of their subscriptions, bonuses and 
interest.30 As Lord Parker observed, this approach operated to identify 
the depositors’ money “by a process of exclusion”.31 The practical result 
was to ‘immunise’ the shareholders from the ultra vires activities. This 
result and approach was confirmed by a majority of the Court of Appeal.32 
20 See further Re Guardian Permanent Benefit Building Society (1882) 23 Ch D 
440 (CA) at 457–458 per Jessel MR.
21 Sinclair v Brougham, above n 1, at 446 per Lord Parker. 
22 At 425 per Viscount Haldane LC.
23 At 456 per Lord Sumner.
24 Stoljar, above n 5, at 21.
25 Sinclair v Brougham, above n 1, at 439 per Lord Parker.
26 At 425 per Viscount Haldane LC. See also 445–446 per Lord Parker.
27 Stoljar, above n 5, at 21.
28 By consent it had been agreed that costs, and the claims of trade 
creditors (which were “inconsiderable in number and value”: Sinclair 
v Brougham, above n 1, at 427 per Lord Dunedin) and some of the 
members/shareholders that had reached a compromise agreement with 
the depositors would be paid first.
29 Re Birkbeck Permanent Benefit Building Society [1912] 2 Ch 183.
30 Sinclair v Brougham, above n 1, at 411–412.
31 At 445.
32 Re Birkbeck Permanent Benefit Building Society, above n 29.
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As identified by Lord Parker, however, a logical difficulty with this 
approach is that the shareholders were legally entitled to all of the 
Society’s assets once prior claims (such as trade creditors) had been 
satisfied. 33 This would suggest that the depositors had no claim.
Fletcher Moulton LJ dissented. He thought that the logic of ultra 
vires required the depositors to be paid first. He reasoned that the 
shareholders were entitled to participate only in the distribution of the 
Society’s assets. To determine this, the depositors’ claim needed to be first 
satisfied.34 It was only once the depositors had recovered their deposits 
that the Society’s assets could be identified and then distributed to the 
shareholders.
A common feature of the approach of Neville J and the members of 
the Court of Appeal is that the shareholders’ claim was seen as arising 
from the fact of their shareholding in the Society. This overlooks the fact 
that the ultra vires banking business had completely overshadowed or 
dominated the Building Society. In 1910 ultra vires deposits exceeded 
shareholder funds by a factor of ten.35 Reflecting this dominance, the 
activities of the Building Society had been incorporated into or absorbed 
into that of the bank. The result was that not only borrowings from the 
depositors but also shareholder funds had been used in the banking 
business. The amount was unclear, but as Viscount Haldane LC observed, 
“[a] large part” of the shareholders’ funds had “probably been applied 
ultra vires in the acquisition of the assets of the banking business”,36 assets 
to which the Society was not entitled to.37 This is a third consequence 
flowing from the ultra vires banking business. The lack of legal capacity 
extended to the misuse of the Society’s own funds (contributed by the 
shareholders) in the banking business. As Viscount Haldane observed, 
“The agents of the society … have acted ultra vires in the application not 
only of the depositors’ but of the society’s own money”.38 
The result was that both depositors and shareholders had similar 
claims – for unauthorised use of their funds. This was recognised in their 
Lordships’ application of the proprietary claim to both depositors and 
shareholders (as residual claimants to the Society’s property). Since the 
claims of the other claimants, such as trade creditors, had been satisfied, 
the balance remaining represented the remnants of the funds misused 
by the Society’s agents. The end result was the pari passu distribution 
of the remaining assets (or surviving enrichment) between depositors 
and shareholders.
33 Sinclair v Brougham, above n 1, at 445.
34 At 413. See further Stoljar, above n 5, at 25.
35 At 411.
36 At 423 per Viscount Haldane LC. See also 425 per Viscount Haldane LC 
and 445–447 per Lord Parker.
37 At 445–446 per Lord Parker.
38 At 425 per Viscount Haldane LC.
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Part Two: The current orthodox response
Background: unjust enrichment theory – a focus on receipt subject to 
defences
Over the last few decades the law of unjust enrichment has received 
express recognition by the House of Lords and the Supreme Court.39 
Perhaps more significantly this has included recognition and use of 
the now orthodox four-question enquiry to evaluate unjust enrichment 
claims:40
1. Has [the defendant] benefited or been enriched? 
2. Was the enrichment at the expense of [the plaintiff]? 
3. Was the enrichment unjust? 
4. Are there any defences?
Inherent in this enquiry is the assumption that a claimant who satisfies 
the first three questions is ordinarily41 entitled to recover the value of the 
enrichment received by the recipient defendant.42 Until recently it has 
been assumed that the function of the fourth question is to determine if 
this prima facie entitlement should be relaxed. 
Assuming satisfaction of the first three questions, the result, which 
Birks suggested is “the only acceptable regime”, is one of “strict liability” 
arising from receipt, tempered by defences.43 Of course when describing 
and discussing this regime Birks was thinking of his ‘core case’44 of unjust 
enrichment, the mistaken payment case of Kelly v Solari.45 A feature of this 
core case is that it involves the receipt of money. Money is the universal 
medium of exchange, so typically its receipt constitutes evidence of an 
enrichment.46
39 In Banque Financière de la Cité  v Parc (Battersea) Ltd [1999] 1 AC 221 (HL), for 
example, Lord Steyn confirmed at 227: “… unjust enrichment ranks next 
to contract and tort as part of the law of obligations. It is an independent 
source of rights and obligations”.
40 At 227 per Lord Steyn. See also Benedetti v Sawiris [2013] UKSC 
50, [2014] AC 938 at [10] per Lord Clarke. In Banque Financière 
at 234  Lord Hoffmann preferred a three question enquiry 
(“[F]irst, whether the defendant would be enriched at the plaintiff’s 
expense; secondly, whether such enrichment would be unjust and thirdly, 
whether there are nevertheless reasons of policy for denying a remedy”). 
41 Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, [2016] 3 WLR 399 at [116] and [121] per 
Lord Toulson.
42 Above n 41. Portman Building Society v Hamlyn Taylor Neck (A Firm) [1988] 
4 All ER 202 at 207 per Millett LJ (“… the cause of action for money had 
and received is complete when the plaintiff’s money is received by the 
defendant” and “[i]t does not depend on the continued retention of the 
money by the defendant”).
43 Birks, above n 10, at 7.
44 At 7.
45 Kelly v Solari (1841) 9 M & W 54, 152 ER 24 (Exch).
46 BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v Hunt (No 2) [1979] 1 WLR 783 (QB) at 798 
per Goff J.
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Moving beyond mistaken payments, a question for the law of unjust 
enrichment has been whether a personal restitutionary remedy is 
available in the situation of an ultra vires loan. Given the ordinary 
requirements for an unjust enrichment claim and the nature of money, 
the assumption is that the claim should be available. Questions 1 and 2 
of the now standard enquiry would appear to be satisfied by the transfer 
of funds to the ‘borrower’. And, because the contract of loan is legally 
unenforceable, there has been a total failure of consideration for that 
money, thereby satisfying question 3. The onus would then appear to 
shift to the defendant to establish a defence.
Until the House of Lords reconsidered this matter in Westdeutsche, 
however, the dominant authority was Sinclair v Brougham. And, as we 
have seen, ‘its’ answer was that a personal unjust enrichment claim 
would not be available. 
In reaching this conclusion their Lordships were influenced by the 
fact that both depositor and shareholder funds were misused in the 
bank. Additionally, the recognition that the depositors had a personal 
restitutionary claim to recover the amount of the deposits would “strike 
at the root of the doctrine of ultra vires”,47 which, in this context, had 
the “purpose … [of] protect[ing] the shareholders against ultra vires 
dealings”.48
Indeed, if successful in their personal claim, the depositors would have 
recovered the value of their deposits, despite the subsequent loss of, at 
least, some of that money in the ultra vires banking business. It would 
have been the shareholders who would have to bear the full consequences 
of that loss, albeit theoretically tempered by potential claims against their 
agents for exceeding their authority. This result still seems “repugnant”.49 
Sinclair v Brougham is overruled
Westdeutsche involved ultra vires swap agreements and the issue before 
their Lordships was whether compound interest was recoverable. 
In the course of deciding this issue Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated that 
Sinclair v Brougham should be regarded as overruled, in that “a claimant 
for restitution of moneys paid under an ultra vires, and therefore void, 
contract has a personal action at law to recover the moneys paid”.50 
Haugesund also involved an ultra vires swap agreement, this time 
involving two Norwegian local authorities. Unlike the situation in 
Westdeutsche, the issue whether a lender under an ultra vires contract 
of loan could recover the value of that money through a personal 
restitutionary claim was raised directly51 and answered. Concluding “that 
the majority [in Westdeutsche] … did depart from the decision in Sinclair 
47 Sinclair v Brougham, above n 1, at 414 per Viscount Haldane LC.
48 Stoljar, above n 5, at 24.
49 Birks, above n 10, at 7.
50 Westdeutsche, above n 2 at 714.
51 Haugesund, above n 9 at [63] per Aitken LJ.
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v Brougham”,52 the Court of Appeal went on to find that the money ‘lent’ 
pursuant to an ultra vires borrowing contract was recoverable. The Court 
also recognised that the claim “must be subject, where appropriate, to 
any available restitutionary defences”,53 principally change of position. 
To better critique the Court’s consideration of the change of position 
defence two matters need to be explored.
‘Receipt’ and ‘authorised use’
The first matter involves the issue of ‘receipt’. It will be recalled that 
question 1 of the four-question theoretical structure is directed to 
determining whether the defendant has been ‘benefited or enriched’. This 
requires the defendant to have received the benefit or the enrichment – 
either directly or indirectly (for example when money is paid to a third 
party for the defendant’s benefit). ‘Ordinarily’, for example, when the 
claim involves Birks’ ‘core case’ of the mistaken payment of money, this 
is not an issue.54 In Kelly v Solari55 the insurance payout was made to and 
knowingly received by the recipient widow.56 Typically receipt requires 
evidence that the defendant has requested, accepted or otherwise chosen 
to receive that benefit57 but as Kelly v Solari also indicates, in the context 
of mistaken payments, the subsequent use or retention of the payment 
suffices.
Sinclair v Brougham illustrates that receipt may become an issue in the 
context of an ultra vires loan. As Lord Sumner reasoned, “receipt is an 
essential”58 and because of the ultra vires doctrine the Society could not 
request, accept or receive the deposits. And while the Society’s agents 
may have ‘factually’ received the deposits, legally they were unable to 
‘receive’ them on behalf of the Society.59 The end result was that at the 
most the Society acquired a sort of possession of the deposits (and their 
proceeds) and this was not enough to constitute receipt to justify the 
imposition of a personal liability upon the Society to pay their value.
So why was ‘receipt’ (or more precisely its absence) not an issue in 
52 At [87] per Aitken LJ and at [148] per Etherton LJ.
53 At [87] per Aitken LJ.
54 Circumstances can be envisaged when it may become an issue, for 
example, when the payer unilaterally deposits the funds directly into 
the recipient’s bank account.
55 Kelly v Solari, above n 45.
56 But see Stephen A Smith “A Duty to Make Restitution” (2013) 26(1) CJLJ 
157 and Klimchuk, above n 17 at 77 (raising the issue whether the cause 
of action may also require that the recipient be aware of the circumstances 
that might give rise to an obligation to restore the value of the enrichment).
57 Falcke v Scottish Imperial Insurance Co (1886) 34 Ch D 234 (CA) at 248 per 
Bowen LJ: “Liabilities are not to be forced upon people behind their backs 
any more than you can confer a benefit upon a man against his will”. 
58 Sinclair v Brougham, above n 1, at 452 per Lord Sumner.
59 At 452–453 per Lord Sumner: “If it was ultra vires for the society … to 
borrow the money on its promise to repay, it was ultra vires for it to 
authorise its officers to do so on its behalf”. 
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Haugesund? One answer is that, post-Sinclair v Brougham, courts have 
developed a distinction between receipt (in a consensual sense) and 
the fact of receipt (typically evidenced by a swelling of assets). As Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson observed in Westdeutsche:60
… although it was ultra vires the society [in Sinclair v Brougham] to enter 
into a contract to repay the moneys, it was not ultra vires the society to 
receive moneys.
It is unclear what authority “to receive moneys” entails but this 
reasoning provides a means of recognising the important ‘receipt’ 
requirement while addressing the logic that was accepted in Sinclair v 
Brougham, that an ultra vires borrower cannot receive the loan. 
As noted earlier the fact situation in Haugesund (and in Westdeutsche) 
is different from that in Sinclair v Brougham. It will be recalled that in 
Sinclair v Brougham the subsequent use of those deposits in conjunction 
with shareholders’ funds in the bank were also ultra vires the Society. 
In contrast, in Haugesund the lack of capacity applied only to the 
borrowing of the funds. There was no suggestion in that case that agents 
of the local authorities employed the funds in ways that were ultra vires. 
This leads to the second matter – ‘authorised use’. In Sinclair v Brougham 
Lord Parker recognised that even though the Society lacked authority 
to borrow, if that money was used by the Society (or its agents) for 
“legitimate purposes” (ie purposes that were within the Society’s power 
to use the money for), that legitimate use would justify the imposition 
of liability upon it.61 
An immediate parallel can be drawn with Re Cleadon Trust Ltd.62 
Although not an ultra vires borrowing case, it gives guidance on the 
similar issue of liability for intra vires but unauthorised acts. The case 
involved a claim to prove in the winding up of an insolvent company. 
The dominant director and shareholder, Mr Creighton, had paid money 
directly to creditors in purported discharge of company debts (or those of 
a wholly owned subsidiary, the repayment of which had been guaranteed 
by the company). These payments caused to be problematic, simply 
because they were not made in response to any valid request by the 
company. Mr Creighton’s claim was rejected by a majority of the court. 
Applying an equity that has its origins in unauthorised borrowings by 
agents63 and married women,64 and borrowings by companies that had 
60 Westdeutsche, above n 2, at 713 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
61 Sinclair v Brougham, above n 1, at 446: “... if the agents of a society, having 
power to borrow, borrow money intending, to the knowledge of the 
lenders, to apply it for an illegitimate purpose, but in fact apply it for the 
legitimate purposes of the society, there seems no reason, either in law 
or in equity, why the loan to the extent to which it is so utilized should 
not be treated as valid”.
62 Re Cleadon Trust Ltd [1939] Ch 286 (CA).
63 Bannatyne v D & C MacIver [1906] 1 KB 103 (CA).
64 Jenner v Morris (1861) 3 DE G F & J 45, 45 ER 795 (Ch). 
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exceeded their borrowing limits (with the result that the new borrowing 
is ultra vires),65 the majority of the Court of Appeal considered that 
Mr Creighton’s claim would have been successful if the payments had 
been used by an agent of the company “who had authority from the 
company either to make the particular payment or generally to make 
payments”.66 
Returning to Haugesund, the subsequent use of these borrowed funds 
by the local authorities’ agents for authorised purposes engaged the 
Cleadon Trust ‘equity’. The result is that the local authorities obtained 
the benefit of these funds. 
Application of change of position in Haugesund
While a relatively new ‘judicial’ development, the common law change 
of position defence is of fundamental importance for the law of unjust 
enrichment or, perhaps more accurately, for its expansion. As Virgo 
notes:67
The recognition of the defence is of vital importance to the development of 
the law of restitution. For, by recognizing that changes in the defendant’s 
position after he or she has received a benefit is relevant to the success 
of the restitutionary claim, it is possible to adopt a wider interpretation 
of the underlying cause of action, particularly the grounds of restitution 
for purposes of the action founded on the reversal of the defendant’s 
unjust enrichment. 
Even in the Birksian ‘core case’ of unjust enrichment – mistaken 
payments – Barclays Bank Ltd v W J Simms, Son and Cooke (Southern) Ltd68 
shows an early association between the recognition of this defence and 
an expansion in recovery, there beyond ‘liability’ mistakes to include 
‘causative’ mistakes. And it will be recalled that Birks associated 
the recognition of this defence with the judicial reconsideration in 
Westdeutsche of the consequences of ultra vires borrowing.69
Against this background it is not surprising that change of position 
was raised in Haugesund. There the funds were invested in financial 
instruments that “proved disastrous”.70 The local authorities sought to 
offset the loss against their restitutionary liability to pay the amount 
of the loan. The Court of Appeal concluded that the defence was not 
available. In so doing it distinguished two types of situations giving rise 
to restitutionary liability. One is where the “defendants obtains … money 
65 Re Cork and Youghal Railway Co (1869) LR 4 Ch App 748 (CA); Blackburn 
Building Society v Cunliffe, Brooks & Co (1882) 22 Ch D 61 (CA).
66 Re Cleadon Trust Ltd, above n 62, at 321 per Clauson LJ. See further 321–325 
for a discussion of the underlying principle.  
67 Graham Virgo The Principles of the Law of Restitution (3rd ed, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2015) at 679–680.
68 Barclays Bank Ltd v W J Simms, Son and Cooke (Southern) Ltd [1980] QB 677 
(QB).
69 Birks, above n 10, at 254.
70 Haugesund, above n 9, at [6] per Aikens LJ.
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in circumstances where he understands, in good faith, that it is his to 
keep and do what he likes with”.71 An example is a mistaken payment 
to a recipient who is unaware of the payer’s mistake. In this situation 
the defence is potentially available. 
The second situation arises:72 
… where a defendant obtains money and, at the time of receipt, he 
understands that he will have to repay that sum at some stage in the 
future, which point has usually been identified between the payer and 
the payee, usually in a contract or what was, at the time, thought to be 
a valid contract. 
In this situation the defence is said to be not available.
The facts in Haugesund brought it within the second situation. Despite 
the ultra vires nature of the underlying transaction, the local authorities 
were treated as understanding that the funds would need to be repaid 
and by investing the funds they “took the risk” that the investment might 
perform poorly.73 Underlying this conclusion is the fact that there was no 
suggestion that the local authorities lacked the legal capacity to invest 
its funds in financial instruments.
In the context of a solvent defendant, that had the authority to invest 
funds in financial investments (and by so doing, can be said to have 
benefitted from the funds), this conclusion seems appropriate. But outside 
those parameters, especially if the use of the funds is ultra vires, there 
is a ‘niggling’ issue of whether this approach is consistent with public 
policy underlying why the use of the funds is declared to be ultra vires. 
We turn to this situation.
Part Three: Change of position and ultra vires transactions
Denials and defences
As was noted in the Introduction, through the work of Goudkamp and 
Mitchell we now understand that “rules governing the imposition of 
liability for unjust enrichment” fall into two categories – ‘denials’ and 
‘defences’.74 It will be recalled that a denial is directed to negating one 
of the elements of the unjust enrichment claim, for example, that the 
defendant received an enrichment. By contrast a defence assumes that 
all the elements have been satisfied but raises a reason why the claim 
should be reduced or should not succeed. 
Goudkamp and Mitchell concluded that the change of position defence 
could operate as either a denial or as a defence. This is significant. 
An immediate important practical difference between a defence and a 
denial involves the burden of proof. As Goudkamp and Mitchell observe, 
some arguments that are commonly advanced for the recognition of 
71 At [123] per Aikens LJ.
72 At [123] per Aikens LJ.
73 At [124]–[126] per Aikens LJ and [153] per Etherton LJ.
74 Goudkamp and Mitchell, above n 15, at 133.
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defences to unjust enrichment claims – such as “situations in which 
justice favours the defendant’s retaining a benefit” and/or emphasise 
security of receipt75 – may be better achieved by “collapsing” them “into 
the elements of [the] action”76 or, in other words, by regarding them as 
denials. “This is because the claimant bears the burden of proving the 
elements of his action”.77 Applying this distinction to change of position, 
as recognised and advanced by the American Law Institute in The 
Restatement Third: Restitution and Unjust Enrichment,78 Goudkamp and 
Mitchell concluded that the defence or denial status of change of position 
turned on whether the enrichment element in the cause of action focuses 
on the time of receipt (when change of position operates as a defence) 
or time of retention (when it operates as a denial).79 
The status of change of position has been considered further by 
Dennis Klimchuk.80 He recognises that the concern of change of position, 
with the defendant’s disenrichment, mirrors the element in the unjust 
enrichment action – that the defendant be enriched. In turn, this can 
provide the foundation for a “plausible” argument that it is a denial.81 
But he concludes that requirements associated with a successful plea of 
change of position indicate that it operates as a defence. These include 
the defendant’s “good faith”, and that:82  
… the good faith expenditure have been either extraordinary or have been 
such as to leave the defendant in the position that full restitution would 
make her worse off relative to the status quo ante.
These requirements are not mirrored in the elements of the action.
This analysis seems correct in the context of the ‘core case’ of unjust 
enrichment (or to use Klimchik’s phrase – the “paradigmatic cases of the 
liability-mistaken payment”)83 and the “paradigmatic cases of change 
of position” where the defendant “will have done something” with the 
enrichment.84
But what about its potential application in the ultra vires borrowing and 
unauthorised use situation? First, the variations in ultra vires transactions 
should be noted.
75 At 143 (referring to arguments advanced by Graham Virgo The Principles 
of the Law of Restitution (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) 
at 665–667).
76 Goudkamp and Mitchell, above n 15, at 144.
77 At 144.
78 American Law Institute Restatement Third: Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment (American Law Institute Publishers, Saint Paul (Minn), 2011).
79 Goudkamp and Mitchell, above n 15, at 156–158.






The range of ultra vires transactions
Ultra vires transactions can arise in a range of situations; in each, 
underlying public policy may differ. Indeed, in Haugesund Aitken and 
Etherton LJJ agreed that public policy underlying the conferral of limited 
authority may be an important consideration for an unjust enrichment 
claim. They differed, however, in how it would be considered. 
Prompted by Westdeutsche, Aitken LJ concluded that:85 
… there is no longer any general public policy rule of English law 
that either prevents or restricts the right to claim restitution of money 
advanced under a borrowing contract that is void as being ultra vires 
the borrower.
But if the above “general public policy rule” in favour of recovery 
was “inconsistent with the express provisions of a statute or … its clear 
intention”,86 Aitken LJ considered that it would have to concede priority 
to that specific policy; this would be achieved through a public policy 
defence.87
Etherton LJ also appeared to accept that for the purposes of establishing 
the claim all ultra vires borrowing is all the same, but unlike Aitken LJ 
he thought that specific policy issues relating to that transaction could 
be relevant considerations for the purposes of change of position.88 
In this respect Etherton LJ is not alone. 
Commentators also have suggested that policy considerations should 
influence the application of change of position. For example, the 
recognition by Aitken LJ in Haugesund that public bodies may be able 
to raise a change of position defence has been questioned as being “too 
generous to their taxpayers”.89 It is said that in this situation the public 
(in whose interests the public body is acting) and not the lender should 
bear the cost of the public body’s ultra vires act,90 presumably because 
the funds will have been expended on authorised purposes.
In contrast, when the ultra vires borrower is a minor the consensus 
appears that “there is no doubt that the policy of the law is to protect 
the minor”91 from “burdensome debt howsoever arising”,92 even if, as it 
85 Haugesund, above n 9, at [96] per Aikens LJ.
86 At [96] per Aikens LJ.
87 At [92]–[96] per Aikens LJ. In Haugesund it was unsuccessfully argued that 
the Norwegian Local Government Act 1992 required the recognition a 
public policy defence that would restrict liability to the amount recovered 
from the investments. This was rejected as having no factual basis (at 
[102]).
88 At [151] per Etherton LJ.
89 Charles Mitchell, Paul Mitchell and Stephen Watterson (eds) Goff & Jones: 
The Law of Unjust Enrichment (9th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2016) at 
[34–38] (footnote omitted).
90 At [34–38], referring to arguments raised in [27–61] to [27-63].
91 Birks, above n 10, at 254.
92 At 255.
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has been suggested, this requires modifications to the typical application 
of change of position. So, while Lord Goff considered that the defence 
“is not open to one who has … paid away the money with knowledge 
of the facts entitling the plaintiff to restitution”,93 the current editors of 
Goff & Jones94 suggest that a minor should be allowed to:95 
… rely on the change of position defence in a wider set of circumstances 
than would normally be permitted, so that he can escape liability for that 
portion of the value which he has consumed or otherwise disposed of by 
the time of the action, even if he was aware of the circumstances entitling 
the claimant to restitution.
Both Birks and the editors of Goff & Jones justify the special protection 
of minors only to the extent that the minor does not remain enriched 
at the time of the claim. “[P]rotection of the minor is not subverted by 
making him give up still surviving enrichment”.96 Underlying this is the 
suggestion that at its core, or at least in this context, change of position 
is responding to the loss of the original enrichment; the recipients 
disenrichment. 
A sui juis change of position? 
Klimchuk may be correct that in its paradigmatic case, change of 
position operates as a defence. But, it appears that there is a growing 
recognition that in certain situations, policy considerations should shape 
the application of change of position. Indeed, once the focus turns to the 
fact of disenrichment, change of position starts operating as a denial. 
Further support for this ‘denial’ version comes from an unlikely source 
– commentators, such as Elise Bant, who objected to Birks’ attempt to 
link change of position with disenrichment. One of Bant’s concerns is 
that a disenrichment focus means that “the change of position enquiry 
must mirror the enrichment element of the cause of action”,97 thereby 
potentially limiting its scope.98 
Most would agree with Bant’s criticism of disenrichment as “an 
incomplete and problematic explanation” of the change of position 
93 Lipkin Gorman, above n 11, at 580 per Lord Goff.
94 Mitchell, Mitchell and Watterson, above n 89. 
95 At [34–17].
96 Birks, above n 10,  at 255. See also Mitchell, Mitchell and Watterson, above 
n 89, at [34–16].
97 Elise Bant “Change of Position: Outstanding Issues” in Andrew Dyson 
and James Goudkamp and Frederick Wilmost-Smith (eds) Defences in 
Unjust Enrichment (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2016) 133 at 142.
98 Bant’s researches reveals an evolving Australian jurisprudence that 
suggests that the courts should look beyond surviving enrichment to 
consider if there has been an irreversible change in the defendant’s 
position, for example a decision to cease work and commence university 
studies. If so, “to require the defendant to make restitution … would be 
to place her in an entirely different position from the one she occupied 
prior to his receipt”. Bant, above n 97, at 147 (citing Gertsch v Atsas [1999] 
NSWSC 898, (1999) 10 BPR 18 431).
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defence. But this does not mean that in some situations the defence is 
not, and cannot be, disenrichment–focused. The immediate result is the 
recognition that what we have referred to as change of position is in fact 
a term for a category containing a range of different responses.99 
We return to Klimchuk. He recognised that there are some non–
paradigm examples of the change of position, for example the situation of 
a mistaken payment that is then stolen by a thief. Because the enrichment 
is lost through the actions of a third party, as opposed to those of the 
recipient, this situation does not fit the paradigm model. Klimchuk saw 
this situation as “akin to but not quite a denial”.100 He described it as 
‘defeat’ – by which he meant “a claim that undercuts a cause of action 
without precisely denying any of its elements”.101 
A twist with the ultra vires borrowing and unauthorised use situation 
is that the funds are used in an unauthorised way. As noted earlier, in 
Sinclair v Brougham the Society and its agents lacked any authority to lend 
money to bank customers or to invest it.102 It may be that the application 
of change of position in this situation operates as a defeat. This may 
be important for the purposes of the burden of proof. By virtue of the 
reasoning in Westdeutsche the receipt of the enrichment cannot be denied, 
but the subsequent disenrichment through unauthorised use ‘undercuts 
the cause of action’. 
Conclusion
Despite all that to modern eyes, appears ‘wrong’ with Sinclair v 
Brougham, it is suggested that the case should not be put “on one side 
in a pile marked ‘not to be looked at again.’”103 Rather in the ultra vires 
borrowing and unauthorised use situation, typified by that case, its result 
is sound. Recovery for the depositors (and shareholders) was limited 
to the surviving enrichment. The current theoretical focus on receipt 
subject to change of position can replicate that result, but to do so the 
application of the change of position doctrine in this situation should 
be seen as being sui juris – that it is moulded by both the underlying 
policy considerations that make the use of the funds ultra vires and the 
fact of the disenrichment.
99 Klimchuk, above n 17, at 85: “If, as we might reasonably enough hold, two 
claims that occupy different places in the taxonomy of defences cannot 
properly speaking be the same defence, I think the conclusion to draw is 
that ‘change of position’ collects two defences”.
100 At 85.
101 At 85.
102 Sinclair v Brougham, above n 1, at 425 per Viscount Haldane LC. See also 
445–446 per Lord Parker.
103 Re King (decd) [1963] Ch 459 (CA) at 483 per Lord Denning MR. These 
comments were not directed to Sinclair v Brougham. 
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